This paper examines how the quality of stock analysts' forecasts is related to conflicts of interest from investment banking and brokerage. We consider four aspects of forecast quality: accuracy, bias and frequency of revision of quarterly earnings forecasts, and relative optimism in long-term earnings growth (LTG) forecasts. Using a unique dataset that contains the revenue breakdown of analysts' employers among investment banking, brokerage, and other businesses over the 1994-2003 period, we establish two main findings. First, there appears to be no relation between accuracy or bias in quarterly forecasts and several measures of conflict severity, after controlling for forecast age, firm resources and analyst workloads. This result holds even for technology stocks and during the late 1990s stock market boom. Second, relative optimism in LTG forecasts and the frequency of revision of quarterly earnings forecasts are positively related to the importance of brokerage business to analysts' employers. Additional tests suggest that quarterly forecast revisions occur for purposes other than purely to provide investors with timely, accurate forecasts. Overall, our results on LTG forecasts and forecast revision frequency suggest that brokerage conflicts are important in shaping analysts' forecasting behavior.
Introduction
In April 2003, ten of the largest Wall Street firms reached a landmark settlement with the New York State Attorney General (NYSAG), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other Federal and state securities regulators on the issue of conflicts of interest faced by stock analysts. The firms agreed to pay a record $1.4 billion in penalties to settle government charges that securities firms routinely issued optimistic stock research in order to win investment banking (IB) business from the companies they covered. The alleged problems addressed by the settlement are exemplified by the case of Jack Grubman, perhaps the most influential telecom analyst during the late 1990s stock market boom. Grubman, then an analyst with Salomon Smith Barney, raised his rating on AT&T stock in November 1999 from a 'hold' to a 'strong buy' in an apparent bid to curry favor with AT&T (see Gasparino (2002) ). 1 The settlement, which was the culmination of a multi-year investigation led by the NYSAG Eliot Spitzer, forces securities firms to make structural changes in the way they handle equity research (see Smith, Craig and Solomon (2003) ). For example, analysts are no longer allowed to attend IB sales pitches with bankers, and securities firms are required to maintain separate reporting and supervisory structures for their research and IB operations. Firms must tie analyst pay to the quality and accuracy of analysts' research rather than to the amount of IB business it generates. In addition, an analyst's written report on a company must disclose whether his firm conducts IB business with the researched company.
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The investigation and the settlement are based on the premise that independent analysts, who do not face conflicts of interest, indeed produce superior, unbiased stock 1 Other instances of alleged conflicts of interest abound. A recent example involved Phua Young, a Merrill Lynch analyst who followed Tyco. Merrill reportedly hired Young in September 1999 at the suggestion of Dennis Kozlowski, then Tyco's CEO. The earlier Merrill analyst had been highly critical of Tyco, while Young acted as a cheerleader for the company. See Maremont and Bray (2004). research. In this paper, we provide evidence on whether the quality of analysts' stock research is related to the magnitude of their conflicts of interest. We focus on an important product of analyst research: forecasts of corporate earnings and earnings growth. We ask four questions. First, is the severity of conflict with investment banking or brokerage related to the accuracy of analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts? Second, are conflicts of interest related to the bias in forecasts? Third, how do conflicts affect the frequency of revision of quarterly earnings forecasts? And finally, what is the relation between conflicts of interest and the relative optimism in LTG forecasts?
The answers to these questions are important to stock market participants, regulators and the academic profession. Both retail and institutional investors use analyst reports to form expectations about the prospects of a company. In fact, institutional investors seem to rely so much on analysts' opinions that they generally avoid investing in stocks without analyst coverage (see, e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) ). Numerous academic studies find that changes in analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations have investment value (see, e.g., Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) , Stickel (1991) , Womack (1996) , Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2001) , and Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004) ). Moreover, analysts are widely quoted in the news media on major corporate events, and their pronouncements on television can lead stock prices to respond within seconds (see Busse and Green (2002) ).
To analyze these issues empirically, we have compiled a unique dataset that contains the revenue breakdown of analyst employers (most of which are private firms not subject to the usual disclosure requirements for publicly traded companies) into revenues from investment banking, brokerage, and other businesses. This information allows us to examine in detail the relation between the quality of analyst research and potential conflicts arising from IB and brokerage businesses. We perform univariate and panel regression analyses of over 170,000 quarterly earnings forecasts and over 38,000
LTG forecasts for about 7,400 U.S. public companies over the time period January 1994 to March 2003. The forecasts are made by over 3,000 analysts employed by 39 publicly traded securities firms and 124 private securities firms.
Prior academic research has focused on conflicts faced by analysts in the context of pre-existing underwriting relationships. For instance, Lin and McNichols (1998), 4 Michaely and Womack (1999) and others find that analysts employed by underwriters of security offerings tend to be more biased and optimistic about the prospects of the issuing company than other analysts. Our paper contributes to this line of research in several ways. First, we examine the conflict of interest arising from investment banking in general, rather than solely from security offerings. 3 In addition to providing underwriting services to clients, an investment bank can sell them advisory services on issues of corporate control and restructuring.
Second, while prior academic research, the news media, and regulators have generally focused on conflicts from IB business, our data allow us to expand the scope of analysis to include conflicts from brokerage business as well. As discussed in Section 2 below, IB and brokerage operations are two distinct sources of potential conflicts of interest, and they may influence analyst behavior in different ways. Third, our approach takes into account both actual as well as potential conflicts from IB activities. As long as an analyst's firm has an IB business, even if the firm does not currently do business with the company followed by the analyst, it might like to do so in the future. Fourth, prior academic research on analyst conflicts with IB in the context of security offerings is subject to the alternative interpretation that a company picks the underwriter whose analyst has a higher opinion of the stock. Because we examine research put out by all analysts following a stock over time, our results are not subject to this ambiguity. Finally, our approach has the advantage of yielding much larger sample sizes than those used in prior research.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find no evidence that the accuracy or bias in quarterly forecasts of individual analysts is related to the magnitude of potential conflicts they face with their employers' IB or brokerage businesses, after controlling for forecast age, firm resources and analyst workloads. This result holds even for technology stocks and for forecasts made during the late 1990s stock market boom, sub-samples where analysts may have faced particularly severe conflicts. It holds for analysts 3 Concurrent research by Cowen, Groysberg and Healy (2003) , Jacob, Rock and Weber (2003) and Clarke, Khorana, Patel and Rau (2004) also employs this approach. These studies use Nelson's Directories and SDC Platinum to classify analysts' employers. While these papers are similar in spirit to ours, our unique dataset on the revenue breakdown for analysts' employers allows us to measure the magnitude of the conflicts in addition to their presence. Furthermore, we analyze how conflicts faced by analysts are related to the revision frequency of quarterly earnings forecasts, an issue not addressed by any other study.
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employed by publicly traded as well as private securities firms. The result is also robust to alternate measures of the magnitude of conflicts. Our second key finding is that the level of LTG forecasts and the frequency of revision of quarterly earnings forecasts are positively related to the importance of brokerage conflicts. Further investigation of our result on forecast frequency reveals that the more severe are brokerage conflicts, the less forecast revisions can be explained solely in terms of providing investors with timely and accurate forecasts. Overall, these results suggest that brokerage conflicts play a more important role in shaping analysts' forecasting behavior than has been previously recognized. These findings have important implications for public policy on analyst research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the potential effects of conflicts of interest on analyst forecasts. Section 3 describes our sample and data. Section 4 presents our main empirical results. Section 5 examines two alternative explanations of our results on forecast revision frequency. Section 6 presents results for two interesting sub-samples: technology versus other industry sectors, and the late 1990s versus other time periods. Section 7 discusses the results of several robustness checks and section 8 concludes.
Potential effects of conflicts of interest
This section discusses the potential effects of analysts' conflicts of interest on four aspects of forecasts: accuracy, bias and revision frequency of quarterly earnings forecasts, and relative optimism in long-term earnings growth projections. Section 2.1 deals with investment banking conflicts and section 2.2 deals with brokerage conflicts.
Investment banking conflicts
The most widely discussed conflict arises from the fact that securities firms may seek to win lucrative underwriting business by issuing optimistic research about current or potential clients. forecasts of analysts at independent firms. Likewise, the long-term (three to five year) earnings growth estimates of analysts at investment banking firms should be rosier than the growth projections of independent analysts.
Alternatively, pressure from investment banking operations can sometimes lead to a pessimistic bias in analysts' forecasts. A notion common among market participants is that corporations often seek to meet or beat analysts' quarterly estimates, regardless of the absolute level of performance. Whether or not a company meets its quarterly estimates may serve as a rule of thumb by which boards of directors and investors evaluate corporate managers (see, e.g., Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) and Farrell and Whidbee (2003) ). Indeed, Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) find that firms that exceed the threshold set by analyst estimates subsequently experience higher abnormal stock returns. Therefore, 'lowering the bar' with pessimistic forecasts, especially near the earnings announcement date, may be a way for conflicted analysts to win favor with potential investment banking clients.
If optimistic and pessimistic forecast biases are important, then, ceteris paribus, the overall accuracy of conflicted analysts should be lower than that of independent analysts. However, there are at least two mitigating forces that can lead to greater 7 accuracy among analysts working at large investment banking firms. First, compared to an independent research firm, an investment bank may provide an analyst with a better environment in which to make forecasts. Possible advantages include greater resources and support for conducting research (Clement (1999)) or access to superior information from underwriting and due diligence (Michaely and Womack (1999) ). Second, firms with large investment banking operations can attract analysts with better forecasting ability.
As Hong and Kubik (2003) find, more accurate analysts tend to move to more prestigious securities firms, and such firms are more likely than smaller, regional firms to have significant investment banking operations.
Finally, analysts' concern about their reputations can reduce the detrimental effects of IB conflicts. Reputation can matter in strategic settings with repeated interaction and financial markets can punish misbehaving analysts by hurting their reputations. To the extent that analysts suffer from loss of reputation, they will be less inclined to knowingly issue biased and inaccurate forecasts. Thus, the effect of investment banking conflicts on EPS and LTG forecasting behavior can be expected to depend on multiple and sometimes opposing forces. It is the net effect of these forces that we seek to understand in our empirical analysis below.
Brokerage conflicts
In the case of securities firms that have significant brokerage operations, analysts Out of the 1,098 firms for which we have names, 318 firms did not file an x-17a-5 form with the SEC during our sample period, either because they were based outside of the U.S. or because they were not active broker-dealers during the period. The filings for an additional 81 firms were not available electronically through Global Access. Finally, because the revenue components of broker-dealers are key data items used in this study, we necessarily exclude 454 firms for which no revenue information is available. These firms chose to withhold the income statement portion of their x-17a-5 filings from the public under the SEC's confidential treatment provision. In Panel C, characteristics of EPS and LTG forecasts are reported for the entire sample period. Following much of the literature on analysts' earnings forecasts, we compute forecast bias as the difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS, divided by the stock price twelve months before quarter-end. We define forecast inaccuracy as the absolute value of forecast bias. Bias, inaccuracy, and forecast age are all computed from an analyst's latest forecast for a company during a quarter. In general, the median EPS forecast is slightly pessimistic, but the magnitude of the pessimism is not large-roughly 1.3 pennies on a $50 stock for forecasts made over the one-month or three-month period before quarter-end. The median forecast inaccuracy is larger, about 5.5 pennies on a $50 stock for both forecast periods. For long-term earnings growth projections, the median forecast level is strikingly high, about 16% per year. 10 Over the three (six) month period 12 preceding quarter-end, the median analyst following a company issues just one quarterly EPS forecast; the mean number of forecasts is 1.3 (1.7).
Panel D reports further characteristics of analysts and their employers. The number of analysts employed by the analyst's firm, number of companies covered, and number of I/B/E/S industry groups covered are all measured over the calendar year in which forecasts occur. We exclude analysts that are present in the EPS detail file in 1983 (the first year for which quarterly EPS forecasts are available through I/B/E/S) because we cannot fully observe the employment histories of these analysts. Overall, analysts in our sample do not appear to cover companies for long periods of time. The median company-specific forecasting experience of an analyst is about 1.1 years; her median general forecasting experience is about three years. 11 The median analyst works for a securities firm that employs 61 analysts and tracks nine companies in two different threedigit I/B/E/S industry groups.
Appendix Table A Analyst experience is short because of at least three reasons. First, we only measure experience issuing quarterly EPS forecasts. Any additional experience issuing LTG forecasts or stock recommendations is not included in our measure. Second, securities firms hired a number of new analysts during the late 1990s stock market boom, a time period included in our sample. Third, company-specific forecasting experience is low because of large turnover in the portfolio of stocks followed by an analyst. This happens particularly after analysts change employers, which occurs quite frequently. 12 The commission revenue slightly exceeds the total revenue. The latter includes a loss from trading.
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$2.4 billion is from investment banking, $4.7 billion from brokerage commissions, and the rest from other businesses.
Empirical results
We present our results on forecast accuracy in section 4.1, forecast bias in section 4.2, the level of LTG forecasts in section 4.3 and revision of quarterly earnings forecasts in section 4.4. Table 2 shows univariate comparisons of quarterly EPS forecast inaccuracy for analysts employed at firms with and without significant investment banking (or brokerage) business. We define a broker-dealer to have significant ( business. These are followed by a row showing p-values for differences between the two rows. The rows labeled 1 and 2 are for firms without and with significant IB business.
Forecast accuracy
The rows labeled 3 and 4 are for firms without and with significant brokerage business.
Rows 5 and 6 and rows 7 and 8 conduct comparisons between firms with and without a particular type of business, conditional on the absence of the other type of business. The basic message from Panel A is that analysts employed by firms with significant brokerage business (row 4) make forecasts that are somewhat less accurate than forecasts made by the control group of analysts (row 3). This finding holds even if their employer does not have significant IB business (row 6 versus row 5).
Panel B shows corresponding results for forecasts made over the three-month period prior to quarter-end. Here, the results for firms with versus without significant brokerage operations mirror those in Panel A. In addition, analysts employed by firms with significant IB but no significant brokerage business (row 8) make forecasts that are somewhat more accurate than forecasts made by the control group of analysts (row 7).
We next conduct regression analyses linking forecast inaccuracy to our measures of conflict severity. In these regressions, we include variables that have been found in prior research to affect forecast accuracy, such as forecast age, individual analyst characteristics, and employer size (see, e.g., Mikhail, Walther and Willis (1997), Clement (1999) , and Jacob, Lys and Neale (1999)). Since the publicly-traded and private firms in our sample likely differ in ways that are not fully captured by size, we also control for public versus private status. Our basic model is given by the following: where we estimate cross-sectional regressions for each year-quarter and make inferences based on the time-series of coefficient estimates. 13 In both of these approaches, we include industry dummies as well as the natural logarithm of the followed company's market capitalization one year prior to quarter end. Finally, in the third approach, we hold company-year-quarter effects as fixed because we are only interested in determining whether a particular analyst characteristic (namely, independence) is related to forecast inaccuracy. The regressions exclude a small number of observations for which an employer's total revenues are zero or negative due to securities trading losses. Table 4 shows univariate comparisons, similar to the accuracy comparisons in Table 2 , of forecast bias between different types of employers. Differences in average bias between different employer groups are mostly insignificant. Based on comparisons of median values, analysts at firms with significant IB (brokerage) business appear to be slightly more pessimistic (optimistic) in both panels. Table 5 shows estimated coefficients from regressions of forecast bias using the three econometric approaches employed in Table 3 . The explanatory variables are the same as in equation (1). Here too, the unit of observation in the pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions is an analyst-company-year-quarter. The coefficients of IB and COM variables are insignificant in both panels under each of the three estimation approaches.
Forecast bias
There is no systematic evidence that forecast bias is related to the magnitude of potential conflicts with the IB or brokerage businesses of an analyst's employer. Forecasts made earlier tend to be more optimistic, consistent with the pattern documented in Brown, Foster and Noreen (1985) and more recently, in Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004) .
An analyst's optimism also increases with his company-specific forecasting experience.
Forecast pessimism increases with company size. This is consistent with the view that for large, established companies, meeting or beating analyst expectations is more important than inflating expectations.
Long-term earnings growth (LTG) forecasts
The univariate comparisons in Table 6 of long-term (three to five year) earnings growth forecasts reveal some notable differences. For example, mean growth forecasts are slightly less optimistic for analysts employed by firms with significant IB business (row 2) compared to the control group of analysts (row 1). For analysts employed by firms with substantial brokerage business (rows 4 or 6), LTG forecasts are higher than forecasts of the control group. For analysts employed by firms with significant IB but insignificant brokerage business (row 8), LTG forecasts are higher than for the control group (row 7). But the sample sizes in this last comparison are quite small and do not warrant strong conclusions. Table 7 shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions and fixed effects regressions explaining LTG levels. We do not use pooled OLS regressions here because of a natural quarter-to-quarter serial dependence in the level of growth forecasts for a company. The unit of observation in the panel regressions is an analyst-company-yearquarter. The explanatory variables are the same as in equation (1), except that the forecast AGE variable is no longer relevant and is hence excluded. In the fixed effects regressions, the level of analysts' LTG forecasts increases with the proportion of their employers' revenues from brokerage business (COM). The magnitude of this effect is non-trivial. For instance, an increase in COM from the first to the third quartile of the sample is associated with an increase in the level of LTG of about 0.82% 15 . In addition, the level of LTG forecasts decreases with the size of the analyst's employer. In the Fama-MacBeth regressions, the level of LTG forecasts decreases in an analyst's company-specific forecasting experience and the number of companies followed by the analyst; it increases in the number of industry groups the analyst follows. Table 8 shows results of panel regressions explaining our fourth aspect of analysts' forecasts, namely, the frequency of quarterly EPS forecast revisions. The dependent variable in the OLS specification (column (1)) and the Poisson specification (column (3)) is the number of EPS forecasts an individual analyst issues for a given company during the three-month period preceding the end of a quarter. The dependent variable in the logistic regressions (column (2)) is an indicator variable that equals one if an analyst issues multiple forecasts during the period; it equals zero otherwise. The unit of observation in the regressions is analyst-company-year-quarter. In all three specifications, we treat industry and year-quarter effects as fixed. 16 The explanatory variables are the same as in equation (1), except that the IB and AGE variables are excluded because we have no a priori reason to expect a systematic relation between these variables and the frequency of forecast revision. T-statistics are computed using White's correction for heteroskedasticity.
Frequency of forecast revision
Under each of the three specifications, we find that analysts employed by firms with greater proportions of revenue from brokerage business (COM) issue more frequent forecast updates over the course of the quarter. This result is highly statistically significant. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect appears to be non-trivial. For example, in the OLS specification, an increase in COM from the first to the third quartile of the sample leads to an increase of about .04 in the number of forecasts, or about 3% of the sample mean. Table 8 also reveals that an analyst is likely to revise his forecast more often when the company followed is larger, when his employer is larger, when he has more company-specific forecasting experience, or when he follows more companies. On the other hand, an analyst is likely to revise his forecast less often when he has more general forecasting experience or when his research coverage spans more industries.
Interpretation of results on forecast revision frequency
As discussed in section 2.2, the positive relation we find between COM and forecast revision frequency in section 4.4 above is consistent with two distinct motives.
First, an analyst who is compensated for generating commission revenue is more willing to spend time and effort on making timely forecast revisions that reflect updated expectations about earnings. We refer to this as the 'investor welfare' motive.
Alternatively, the prospect of boosting commissions can lead an analyst to revise his forecasts frequently even with little or no new information. Frequent forecasts can be particularly effective in getting investors to churn their portfolios if successive changes in forecasts are in opposite directions. We call this the 'churning' motive. While the investor welfare motive and the churning motive are not mutually exclusive, the first is consistent with maximization of investors' interests, and the second is not. We attempt to distinguish between these two motives by conducting three tests, presented in sections 5.1 through 5.3.
Commission incentives, earnings uncertainty and revision frequency
As a first test of the two motives for making frequent forecast revisions, we add a measure of earnings uncertainty as an explanatory variable in the Table 8 We find that the coefficients of forecast dispersion and COM are both positive and statistically significant at the .001 level or better in the extended versions of all six models in Table 8 . Our evidence thus suggests that the frequency of forecast updates is driven by investor demand. But, after controlling for this effect, commission incentives play an important role in an analyst's decision on how frequently to revise their forecasts.
To save space, these results are not shown in a table.
Commission incentives and churning
For our second test of the motives for frequent forecast revisions, we devise two simple measures of churning, denoted CHURN 1 and CHURN 2 , and estimate the following regression: The churning story suggests that the stronger is the commission incentive, the larger should be the absolute magnitude of successive changes in forecasts. This implies that the coefficient b 1 in equation (2) between forecast inaccuracy and boldness should be less (more) negative for analysts who face higher (lower) degrees of brokerage conflicts.
Our estimation of equation (3) 
Sub-sample results
We next examine two interesting partitions of our sample. We present the results for technology versus other sectors in section 6.1 and the late 1990s versus other time periods in section 6.2.
Technology versus other industry sectors
Numerous stories in the media suggest that conflicts of interest may have been more pronounced in the technology sector than in other industry sectors during our sample period. We examine this idea by replacing the IB variable in model (1) of Tables   3, 5 and 7 by two variables: IB*TECH and IB*NTECH, and the COM variable in Tables   3, 5 , 7 and 8 by COM*TECH and COM*NTECH. The binary variable TECH equals 1 if the first two digits of the I/B/E/S SIG code of a followed company are '08' (i.e., the company belongs to the technology sector); otherwise, TECH equals zero. NTECH is defined as 1 -TECH.
We find no significant relation between the accuracy or bias in an analyst's quarterly earnings forecasts and the importance of IB (or brokerage) business to her employer for either the technology sector or other industry sectors. The frequency of an analyst's forecast updates is positively related to the importance of brokerage business to her employer for both sectors, with no significant difference in the coefficient estimates.
But the level of analysts' long-term growth forecasts is positively related to the importance of IB and brokerage business of an analyst's employer only for the technology sector; it is insignificant for the remaining sectors as a group. This difference is statistically significant. To save space, these results are not shown in a table.
Late 1990s versus other time periods
The late 1990s was a period of booming stock prices. There is no significant relation between the accuracy or bias in an analyst's quarterly earnings forecasts and the importance of investment banking or brokerage business to his employer for either the late 1990s or other time periods in our sample.
The level of LTG forecasts is unrelated to IB during both time periods. LTG is positively related to COM during the late 1990s and is unrelated to it during other time periods, but the difference is statistically insignificant. The probability of forecast revision is positively related to COM during both time periods, but the coefficient of COM is significantly lower during the late 1990s than during other periods. Once again, to economize on space these results are not shown in a table.
Robustness checks
In this section, we present the results of tests based on two alternate measures of IB and brokerage conflicts, and results from a test that deals with a potential selection bias among our sample of private securities firms. Section 7.1 compares the behavior of completely independent analysts with conflicted analysts. Section 7.2 focuses on analysts with substantial conflicts versus less conflicted analysts. Section 7.3 separately examines the forecasts of analysts employed by publicly traded and private securities firms.
Completely independent analysts
Firms with absolutely no revenues from IB or brokerage businesses may be fundamentally different from firms with revenues from these businesses. Accordingly, we examine the effects of replacing the continuous IB or COM variables in regression Tables   3, 5 and 7 and the COM variable in Table 8 above with binary dummy variables that equal 1 if the firm's revenue from investment banking or brokerage commissions is positive, and equal 0 otherwise. There is no significant relation between accuracy, bias or relative LTG optimism and whether an analyst's employer has any IB or brokerage business. Analysts whose employers have brokerage business revise their forecasts more frequently than do completely independent analysts.
Analysts with substantial conflicts
Next, we use a $10 million cutoff to indicate the presence of a substantial conflict of interest. Accordingly, we replace the IB (COM) variable in Tables 3, 5 , 7 and 8 above with a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm's revenue from investment banking (brokerage commissions) is greater than $10 million; it equals zero otherwise. The qualitative results here mirror those in section 7.1 above, except that the level of longterm growth forecasts is now negatively related to IB and positively related to COM.
Publicly traded and private securities firms
Finally, we separately examine the forecasts of analysts employed by publicly traded and private securities firms. As discussed in section 3, we can only analyze the forecasts of private securities firms that choose to disclose their revenue breakdown publicly in their x-17a-5 filing. This can lead to a potential selection bias with our sample of private securities firms. There is no such selection bias for forecasts made by publicly traded securities firms because all of these firms disclose revenue information in their annual 10-K filings.
Among both publicly traded and private securities firms, we find no relation between the proportion of revenue from IB or brokerage business (IB or COM) and quarterly forecast accuracy, quarterly forecast bias, or relative LTG optimism. Moreover, for both types of firms, the frequency of quarterly forecast revision is positively related to COM. The similarity in results for publicly traded and private securities firms suggests that the potential selection bias discussed above is not serious for our purposes.
Summary and conclusions
The landmark settlement that regulators reached with prominent Wall Street firms in April 2003 mandates sweeping changes in the way that stock research is produced.
Among its key provisions, the settlement requires securities firms to offer independent research to their customers and to create and maintain greater separation between equity research and investment banking activities. The basic premise underlying these requirements is that independent analysts do in fact produce research that is superior to the research of analysts who face potential conflicts of interest from their employers' other businesses.
In this paper, we empirically examine whether the quality of analysts' earnings forecasts is related to the importance of conflicts of interest from investment banking or brokerage businesses. A unique dataset detailing securities firms' revenues from investment banking, brokerage, and other businesses allows us to examine the effects of analyst conflicts on four aspects of forecasts: accuracy and bias in quarterly earnings forecasts, optimism in long-term growth (LTG) forecasts, and the frequency of quarterly forecast revisions.
Our analysis reveals that an analyst's short-term quarterly forecast bias and forecast accuracy do not appear to be systematically related to the importance of investment banking or brokerage business to his employer. This result also holds for forecasts made within the technology sector as well as during the late-1990s stock market boom, contexts in which conflicts of interest may have been particularly severe. In addition, the absence of a link between analyst conflicts and quarterly forecast bias or accuracy holds true for both publicly traded as well as private analyst employers, and it is robust to alternate measures of conflict severity.
We find, however, that the degree of relative optimism in analysts' LTG forecasts is positively related to the share of revenues derived from brokerage commissions. conflicts. The precise nature of trade generation incentives, how they impact investor behavior, and how they might be ameliorated are all interesting issues for future research.
Our findings also highlight a striking difference in analyst behavior for short-term (quarterly EPS) forecasts versus long-term (EPS growth) forecasts. With respect to the degree of optimism, analysts do not appear to systematically respond to conflicts in making short-term forecasts, but they appear to do so in making long-term forecasts.
What accounts for this difference? One possibility is that short-term forecasts place conflicted analysts squarely in the spotlight. If analysts alter their short-term forecasts in response to the conflicts they face, their deception can be revealed with the next earnings release, causing harm to the analysts' reputations and livelihoods. But with long-term forecasts, analysts may not face the same degree of market scrutiny. Investors' memories may be short, and analysts may be able to get away with revising their initial flawed projections. A second possible explanation, implied by dividend growth models, is that equity valuations depend more on long-term growth rates than on the next quarter's earnings, and analysts use the most effective means available to prop up a stock. We leave a complete resolution of this issue to future research. Among private firms, the in-sample firms are smaller than firms that do not disclose their income statements. The median total assets of the two groups are about $0.9 million and $9.4 million, respectively; their median book equity is $0.6 million and $4.9 million, respectively. The median financial leverage of both groups of firms is zero; the mean leverage is slightly lower for the sample firms than for the non-sample firms.
Appendix Financial characteristics of in-sample versus out-of-sample securities firms
The median in-sample firm has about 23% of its assets in cash, compared to 11% for the median out-of-sample firm. All these differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.
The publicly traded securities firms are clearly much larger than either the insample or out-of-sample private firms. The median value of public firms' total assets is about $727 million and their median book equity is about $237 million. They also have larger leverage ratios and lower cash positions compared to private firms in either group. [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] , the distribution of the fraction of total revenues generated from investment banking or brokerage businesses. N is the number of firm-years. Panel C reports characteristics of long-term growth (LTG) forecasts and quarterly EPS forecasts over the entire sample period. Bias is computed as (actual EPSforecast EPS) divided by the stock price twelve months before quarter-end. Forecast error is measured as the absolute value of forecast bias. Statistics for bias, accuracy and forecast age are based on the most recent forecast made by each analyst over the relevant period. Forecast age is the number of days between the forecast date and the earnings release. In Panels B and C, forecasts and broker-years are excluded when total revenues are negative or when fractions of revenue exceed one. In Panels B, C, and D, analyst teams and analysts for which forecasting experience could not be determined are excluded. Panel D reports analysts' experience and workload characteristics measured on an annual basis over the entire sample period. This table presents univariate comparisons of quarterly EPS forecast inaccuracy between different groups of analysts classified according to whether their employer has significant investment banking or brokerage business. Forecast inaccuracy is computed as the absolute value of (actual EPS -forecast EPS) divided by the stock price measured 12 months before quarter end. Forecasts are drawn from the January 1994-June 2003 period. A broker-dealer is defined to have significant (insignificant) investment banking business in a given calendar year if its investment banking revenue as a percentage of its total revenue is in the top (bottom) quartile among all broker-dealers in the sample. Significant or insignificant brokerage business is defined similarly based on commission revenue as a percentage of total revenue. Comparisons are conducted at the level of the company-year-quarter unit. For each publicly-traded company in the I/B/E/S U.S. detail history file for which adequate data are available, forecast errors are averaged for each different type of broker-dealer firm; these averages are then compared using matched-pair t-tests for differences in means and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for differences in distributions. N corresponds to the number of matched pairs. Only the most recent forecasts made by individual analysts over the appropriate forecast period are used. Revenue data are obtained from x-17a-5 or 10-k filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Forecasts are matched with annual broker-dealer financial data corresponding to the latest fiscal year preceding the date of the forecast. 
Table 3 Panel Regression Analysis of Quarterly Earnings Forecast Accuracy
This table reports coefficients from regressions explaining errors in individual analysts' quarterly EPS forecasts made over the January 1994-June 2003 period. Panel A presents results for forecasts made within one month of quarter-end, while Panel B presents results for forecasts made within three months of quarter-end. Only company quarters ending in March, June, September, or December are included. Forecast and reported numbers are based on primary EPS. Forecast error is computed as |reported EPS -forecast EPS| divided by the stock price twelve months before quarter-end. For each forecast period, only the most recent forecast made by an analyst is included. The regressions in (1) are pooled OLS regression estimates using White's correction for heteroskedasticity. The pooled OLS regressions include industry and calendar-quarter dummies (not reported). (2) reports average coefficients obtained from Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions performed on individual calendar quarters over the sample period. Each regression includes unreported industry dummies. In the fixed-effects regressions in (3), company-year-quarter effects are treated as fixed. Revenue data are obtained from x-17a-5 or 10-K filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Each forecast issued by an analyst is matched with broker-dealer revenue data corresponding to the latest fiscal year preceding the date of the forecast. Forecast age is measured as the number of days between the report date and the forecast date. Company-specific and general forecasting experience are measured as the number of years since an analyst first began issuing I/B/E/S EPS forecasts on a particular company or in general. The number of analysts employed by a firm, the number of companies covered by an analyst, and the number of industry groups covered by an analyst are measured over the calendar year of the earnings forecast. Industry groupings are based on I/B/E/S 2-digit SIG codes. Company market capitalization is measured in millions of dollars one year prior to quarter-end. The public brokerage dummy equals unity if a broker-dealer is traded on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq and equals zero otherwise. T-statistics for coefficient estimates are in parentheses. Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions performed on individual calendar quarters over the sample period. Each regression includes unreported industry dummies. In the fixed-effects regressions in (3), company-year-quarter effects are treated as fixed. Revenue data are obtained from x-17a-5 or 10-K filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Each forecast issued by an analyst is matched with broker-dealer revenue data corresponding to the latest fiscal year preceding the date of the forecast. Forecast age is measured as the number of days between the report date and the forecast date. Company-specific and general forecasting experience are (continuous) measures of the number of years since an analyst first began issuing I/B/E/S EPS forecasts on a particular company or in general. The number of analysts employed by a firm, the number of companies covered by an analyst, and the number of industry groups covered by an analyst are measured over the calendar year of the earnings forecast. Industry groupings are based on I/B/E/S 2-digit SIG codes. Company market capitalization is measured in millions of dollars one year prior to quarter-end. The public brokerage dummy equals unity if a broker-dealer is traded on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq and equals zero otherwise. T-statistics for coefficient estimates are in parentheses.
Pooled OLS
(1) (LTG) forecasts made over the January 1994-June 2003 period. The sample period is partitioned into calendar quarters ending March, June, September and December, and a forecast made in a quarter by an analyst/broker pair for a company is retained only if it is the most recent forecast in the quarter. The FamaMacBeth regressions include unreported industry dummies. In the fixed-effects regressions, company-yearquarter effects are treated as fixed. Revenue data are obtained from x-17a-5 or 10-K filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Each forecasting period is matched with broker-dealer revenue data corresponding to the latest fiscal year preceding the date of the forecast. Company-specific and general forecasting experience are measured as the number of years since an analyst first began issuing I/B/E/S EPS forecasts on a particular company or in general. The number of analysts employed by a firm, the number of companies covered by an analyst, and the number of industry groups covered by an analyst are measured over the calendar year of the earnings forecast. Industry groupings are based on I/B/E/S 2-digit SIG codes. Company market capitalization is measured in millions of dollars one year prior to quarter-end. The public brokerage dummy equals unity if a broker-dealer is traded on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq and equals zero otherwise. T-statistics for coefficient estimates are in parentheses.
FamaMacBeth
(1) (3) is the number of EPS forecasts issued by an individual analyst on a given company during the three months preceding the end of the quarter. The dependent variable in the logistic regressions in (2) is an indicator variable equal to unity if an analyst issued more than one forecast during the three-month forecasting period and equal to zero otherwise. Regressions are performed on the pooled sample of observations and include unreported industry and calendar-quarter dummies. Revenue data from x-17a-5 or 10-K filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission are used to construct a variable measuring the potential degree of analysts' conflict of interest. Each forecast period is matched with broker-dealer revenue data corresponding to the latest fiscal year preceding the forecast period. Company-specific and general forecasting experience are measured as the number of years since an analyst first began issuing EPS forecasts through I/B/E/S on a particular company or in general. The number of analysts employed by a firm, the number of companies covered by an analyst, and the number of industry groups covered by an analyst are measured over the calendar year of the earnings forecast. Industry groupings are based on I/B/E/S 2-digit SIG codes. Company market capitalization is measured in millions of dollars one year prior to quarter-end. The public brokerage dummy equals unity if a broker-dealer is traded on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq and equals zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and z-statistics are in parentheses. 
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